Fredsforhandlingerne:
Er Netanyahu manden, der kan skabe fred?
JERUSALEM (15.09.2010): De fleste af dem, der beskæftiger sig seriøst, fordomsfrit og realistisk med Mellemøsten, synes at være enige om, at den eneste mulige, acceptable og holdbare løsning på Israel-Palæstinakonflikten er en to-statsløsning, der betyder, at begge parter må gå på kompromis hver på sin måde. Israelerne må rømme landområder og nedlægge jødiske bosættelser. Og palæstinenserne bliver nødt til at acceptere en mini-stat, der også skal give Israel sikkerhedsgarantier og også må opgive kravet om palæstinensiske flygtninges tilbagevendelse til før-67-Israel.
Når man taler med denne gruppe mennesker, og her taler jeg om politikere, diplomater, akademiske eksperter og forskere, journalister og kommentatorer med flere, så er der rimelig stor enighed om, at når freden en gang kommer (hvis det nogensinde sker), så kommer den til at ligge snublende tæt på det, vi kalder for Clinton-planen efter daværende amerikanske præsident Bill Clinton. Den blev fremsat i december 2000 efter fredsprocessen var brudt definitivt sammen i Camp David nogle måneder forinden, og en ny voldelig palæstinensisk intifada var brudt ud. Ofte omtales planen også som Clinton’s parametre.
Clinton-planen betyder i korte træk, at palæstinenserne vil få en uafhængig stat i hele Gaza-striben og 94-96% af Vestbredden. De 4-6% af Vestbredden, som ville blive annekteret af Israel, ville betyde, at 75-80% af alle bosættere i de store, folkerige bosættelser nær ”den grønne linje” ville kunne blive boende, og Israel derfor ”kun” skulle have et potentielt voldeligt og ødelæggende opgør med de ganske få procent af de mest ekstreme og yderligtgående af bosætterne. Til gengæld for de områder, som Israel efter denne plan annekterer, skal palæstinenserne have andre næsten lige så store områder fra Israel.
Desværre blev Clinton-planen fremsat for sent. Der er mange, der mener, at var den fremsat tidligere, og havde den amerikanske præsident sat magt bag den, så kunne der måske allerede være fred i Mellemøsten i dag. Sådan gik det imidlertid ikke. Alligevel er der rimelig stor konsensus om, at når freden en dag kommer, vil resultatet til forveksling ligne Clinton’s parametre.
Så det er ikke fordi, der mangler endnu en fredsplan. Mellemøsten har mere end tilstrækkeligt med fredsplaner.
Hvad Mellemøsten mangler er inspirerede, visionære og modige ledere, som tør går foran sine folkeslag, og lede dem til en fredsaftale på trods af de stærke kræfter internt, der altid vil torpedere ethvert kompromis.
Og det er heller ikke fordi parterne ikke ved, hvordan freden ser ud. For det ved alle dem, der virkelig ærligt og inderligt vil fred.
Spørgsmålet er, hvordan vi kommer fra den fastlåste situation uden nogen gensidig tillid mellem parterne, til den situation, hvor alle føler sig stærke og sikre nok til at yde de smertefulde kompromisser, som gennemførelsen af en sådan fredsplan nødvendigvis kræver.
Og spørgsmålet er også, om de to ledere, der i dag repræsenterer de to sårede og traumatiserede folk, er de ledere, der kan levere en sådan fred.
Gilead Sher ved, hvad han taler om. Han er israelsk advokat, og allerede under premierminister Yitzhak Rabin i begyndelsen af 90’erne var han involveret i fredsforhandlingerne. Den gang som oberst af reserven i den israelske hær. Senere under premierminister Ehud Barak’s Arbejderpartiregering var han stabschef for premierministerens kontor, og arbejdede meget tæt sammen med regeringen i alle spørgsmål omkring fredsprocessen. Fra 1999-2001 var han Israels chef-fredsforhandler.
Gilead Sher tvivler i kommentaren i den britiske avis The Guardian fra i dag på, om premierminister Benyamin Netanyahu evner at bringe fredsprocessen ret meget udover stadet med photo-opp’s, håndtryk og smarte sound bites ved pressemøderne. Og som tiden ødsles bort, forsvinder muligheden for en to-statsløsning langsomt men sikkert.
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Hvis du vil læse Clinton-planen, har jeg lige lagt dokumentet ud på hjemmesiden:
http://www.steffen-jensen.dk/dan/andre-artikler/180-dokument-clinton-planen/
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Jeg har også for at gøre det nemmere lagt det Sharm el-Sheikh-memorandum ud på hjemmesiden, som Gilead Sher skriver om i sin kommentar. Desværre kan jeg kun nå at lægge en engelsk version af dokumentet ud på siden:
http://www.steffen-jensen.dk/dan/andre-artikler/181-document-the-sharm-el-sheikh-memorandum/
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Link til Gilead Sher's kommentar i The Guardian:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/sep/15/netanyahu-doubt-two-state-solution
WHY I DOUBT NETANYAHU
Time is running out for the majority of Israelis who, like me, believe in a two-state solution.
By Gilead Sher
The Guardian
September 15, 2010
Eleven years ago, on September 4 1999, the government of Israel, under Ehud Barak, and the PLO, under Yasser Arafat, signed an agreement called the Sharm-el-Sheikh Memorandum. It provided that accelerated permanent status negotiations would commence shortly, and that their goal was to reach a framework agreement on permanent status in five months and a comprehensive agreement in one year.
It is the last formal agreement signed between the parties. Hamas is now governing Gaza to the detriment of the PLO, and the schism has further weakened the Palestinian leadership. Moreover, geopolitical developments in the Middle East in the last decade have complicated the already complex setup for negotiations on the hoped for two-states-for-two-people resolution of the conflict.
Yet all parties know what a permanent agreement would look like if it was to resolve the intertwined core issues of territory, Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees and security arrangements. Since President Clinton's parameters were laid down in December 2000, every political initiative to ending the conflict has led to the same fundamental solutions. However, all parties also know that throughout the long quest for peace powerful spoilers and extremists will do their best to avoid compromise. Memories, ethos, fanaticism and religious fundamentalism get the upper hand over reason.
To overcome these difficulties, it is imperative that the White House now conducts a clear, binding, continuous and disciplined process to pave the way to peace: because the two-state solution is not only in the interest of Israel: it is clearly in the interest of the US and the moderate Arab world, too.
It was of no surprise that the settlement moratorium constituted the first stumbling block on the relaunch of the Middle East peace talks this week. As the summit approached, Palestinian speakers offered an uncompromising "all or nothing" standpoint on the issue of Jewish settlements on the West Bank. In Israel there were extensive attempts to appease both the settler community and the rightwing parties in Binyamin Netanyahu's coalition.
Given how high the stakes are for President Obama, one would have thought a compromise on the freeze on settlement construction would have been attained between the three leaders quite a while ago, far from the limelight. The exchange of ambiguous public statements in Sharm-el-Sheikh yesterday seems therefore to serve a longer-term battle, related to an anticipated failure of the talks: who will get the US empathy, and who will be blamed by the US administration.
Netanyahu and Obama recently hailed the US-Israel relationship as an "unbreakable" bond; that relationship is now entering a challenging period. Netanyahu's assumptions in deciding to enter into the negotiation process were presumably three: that an agreement – albeit not a full-fledged permanent status one – was attainable; that the Palestinian leadership is capable of implementing it; and, finally, that he himself is able to eventually get this done by paying a bearable political price. As much as I would like to sustain those assumptions, I doubt the latter two.
Both Mahmoud Abbas and Netanyahu are aware of the substantive differences in their positions, and the difficulties either counterpart faces or might face domestically. But time is running out for those, like me, who want to secure a Jewish and democratic state within recognised boundaries alongside a demilitarised Palestinian state. True, polls consistently demonstrate that Israelis overwhelmingly support the two-state solution. But this majority has not been heard politically. Israelis are starting to realise that, and a few groups are getting their act together to change the course. They say: we are Israeli, Jewish and Zionist, and refuse to apologise for it.
Finally, the peace negotiations are not just a series of meetings and talks, photo-opportunities and summits. There is an urgent need to condition the respective constituencies for peaceful co-existence. It is necessary to begin to restore confidence between the two societies. In the long run, reconciliation between the Arab world and Israel will require healing collective wounds, amending relationships, and building bridges by forgiveness. The Arab peace initiative might provide the basic framework for that.
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/sep/15/netanyahu-doubt-two-state-solution
